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This paper deals with transformations in the labour force, employment and, by 
construction, unemployment. We cover the past three decades and likely outcomes in 
decades following, exploring the historical profile of the labour force in the context of 
employment growth and likely future scenarios of both population and labour force 
participation rates. Following this we consider the methodology behind our projections 
of employment and unemployment, and illustrate differences between projections 
derived on the basis of alternative policy interventions. The implications of  alternative 
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Introduction 
Projections of the Australian population have been regularly produced by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) since the late 1970s.1 Labour force participation is one 
of the most stable economic indicators and this has encouraged the ABS to provide projections 
in this area. The first such projections were published in 19922 with the most recent set 
covering the period from 1999 to 2016.3 These demographic projections have been used to 
alert researchers, policy-makers and the wider community to fundamental changes in the 
structure of the population and the labour force due to the ageing of the population.  
However, almost nothing is available with respect to the likely future profile of either 
employment or unemployment. While aggregate macroeconomic models (such as the 
Treasury’s TRYM model) or general equilibrium models (such as the MONASH model) do 
provide some indications of short-term trends (or future deviations from extrapolated current 
trends) they usually only span several quarters and rarely go beyond a decade.  
The story of unemployment cannot be studied in isolation, and in particular, without 
consideration of employment growth. While the analysis of population and labour force 
provides a picture of long-term trends in economic activity of the population, examination of 
employment and unemployment is much more important from a policy perspective since it 
deals with the behaviour of the economically active subset of the population. 
It is important to note that demand side policies include a number of instruments 
available to the government (such as interest rates and labour market training programs), but 
the range of policy options relevant to population dynamics is much weaker (for example, the 
size and composition of immigration). We should keep in mind that Australia’s internationally 
open character and the importance of the agricultural sector exert an influential role on 
economic activity but are beyond the control of the government. With this acknowledged, there 
still remains room for counter-cyclical policies which impact on employment growth and thus 
unemployment. 
This paper could have been concerned solely with the implications of alternative 
population projections on the profile of the future labour force, but it is much more interesting 
to consider also employment and unemployment. We use the identities which link labour 
market components and a number of scenarios regarding the behaviour of employment growth 
in order to derive alternative profiles of future unemployment. While these profiles are not 
forecasts of future employment, they nevertheless have great value as comparisons of potential 
outcomes in the labour market.  
                                                            
1   See Adam (1992) for a brief historical overview. 
2   ABS (1992). 
3   ABS (1999).  2 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section explains the basic relationships 
between population to the labour force and employment, describes how unemployment fits into 
the picture, and explores the mechanics behind the generation of both population and labour 
force projections. Section three examines the profile of the labour force over the last three 
decades. After this we turn to employment growth over the last three decades and ask what 
happens to the employment profile as a result of just a couple of poor years of growth.  
Finally, we utilize a number of simple scenarios of future employment growth, derived 
from the outcomes of past cycles, to investigate the significance of employment on 
aggregateunemployment and long-term unemployment.  
 
Methodological Issues 
It is useful to begin with some basic definitions. First, the analysis of labour force 
issues is usually restricted to the adult population, that is, persons aged 15 and above. The 
labour force is defined as the sum of all people who are either employed or unemployed. To be 
employed a person must work in the market place (that is, receive income for work) and a 
person is classified as unemployed if he/she is not employed and is both available and looking 
for work.4  
To provide indicators of movements in the labour force economists usually quote 
relative measures of the sizes of the appropriate segments of the labour market. Thus, the 
labour force participation rate is the proportion of the adult population which is in the labour 
force and the unemployment rate is the proportion of the labour force which is in the state of 
unemployment. A different summary of the labour market is the employment-population ratio 
which provides a picture of the labour market unaffected by participation. 
Reliance on a single measure provides an incomplete picture of developments in the 
labour marketand is ill-advised.. For example, during early periods of recovery even rapid job 
creation may have little impact on unemployment if labour force participation rates increase in 
response to job growth. Because of these and other issues a combination of measures will be 
presented. 
The population projections produced by the ABS are based on the cohort component 
method, in which the population is aged year by year and applies pre-specified fertility and 
mortality rates to each cohort (subset) of the population. Traditionally, these cohorts are single 
year sex-specific sub-populations. In addition, the cohort method accounts for migration by 
utilizing pre-specified rates of immigration and emigration.  
The procedure is relatively simple, involving the specification of assumptions 
regarding fertility, mortality and immigration. For example, the latest set of ABS population 
                                                            
4   See ABS (1991) for precise definitions of both the activity test and the availability test.  3 
projections spans fertility rates from 1.6 to 1.75 births per woman. Presentation of a number of 
scenarios provides an indication of the sensitivity of projected trends of population with respect 
to the underlying assumptions. 
The generation of labour force participation rates (and, with population, labour force 
levels) starts with an evaluation of the past trends of labour force participation for sex and age 
group cohorts. Simple linear (or logistic) models are then fitted to the data and used to 
extrapolate future participation rates.5  Since such modelling and derivation of participation 
rates does not incorporate socio-economic factors such as income, it is limited to providing 
only very broad trends in labour force participation rates. Nevertheless, it provides a number of 
variants of the labour force (by multiplying the extrapolated participation rates by the 
population projections) determined by underlying population projections.  
 
Labour Force and Employment: an Historical Overview 
Modern statistical measurement of the labour markets commenced in Australia in 1964 
with regular quarterly surveys of adult populations in capital cities. Later these were extended 
to cover the whole country and in 1978 were transformed into monthly labour force surveys. 
Many facets of labour market measurement had not been standardised until the onset of the 
monthly surveys. In particular, the measurement of long-term unemployment (that is, people 
who have been unemployed for 12 months or longer) was only introduced in February 1978.  
Figure 1 plots the size of the Australian population over the last three decades and 
labour force participation. 
It is evident from this figure that population has been increasing at a very steady rate 
since 1964. On the other hand, participation rates have varied somewhat over the same period, 
ranging from a low of 58.3 per cent at the beginning of the sample to 63.7 per cent in 1990.  
Population changes are essentially due to long-term secular movements in fertility and 
mortality rates, and international migration, while short-term vagaries of the economic business 
cycle influence the labour force participation rate.  
Labour force participation has also exhibited a relatively stable long-term trend. 
Increased entry into the labour force by women has more than compensated for the decrease in 
labour force participation by younger males (due to higher participation in education) and older 
males (due to the trend towards early retirement). The longer term perspective adopted in what 
follows allows us to separate cyclical changes from underlying trend movements in population 
and its components.  
 
 
                                                            
5   See ABS (1999) for a fuller description.  4 

















































1.  ABS, Labour Force, Australia, ABS Catalogue No, 6203.0 (various issues), 





























Sources: As for Figure 1. 
  5 
Figure 2 presents the relative sizes and trends of labour force and employment since 
1964.  
The upward trend in labour force participation and population growth are the reasons 
that the size of the labour force has also been rising over this period, on average by about 2 per 
cent per year. A somewhat different picture emerges with respect to employment, in two ways. 
First, employment is much more variable than the labour force with distinct troughs being 
visible in the major recessions of 1981–82 and 1990–92. Second, since the first oil shock of 
1974, employment growth has become increasingly different from the increases in the labour 
force. The difference between the two is, of course, unemployment, which has been high since 
the mid-1970s and continues to be one of Australia’s major policy challenges.  
It is worth at this point to consider more closely the growth of employment, now 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 

























Note: GDP growth rates are calculated as quarter-to-quarter changes with June values plotted in the 
graph. 
Sources:  
1.  Employment - as for Figure 1. 
2.  GDP - ABS, National Income and Expenditure, Australia, ABS Catalogue No, 5206.0 (various 
issues). 
  6 
By comparing employment growth with the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
a yardstick of the performance of an economy, we can relate developments in employment to 
wider changes in the economy.  Thus, as shown in Figure 3, employment exhibits a very 
cyclical pattern of growth with negative rates during recessions (i.e. when GDP exhibits 
negative growth rates) and positive rates over the remainder of the business cycles.  In other 
words, employment seems to depend more on economic conditions (aggregate demand in the 
economy) rather than on the labour force (aggregate supply).   
Over the last three decades two years, 1983 and 1991, stand out with respect to the 
magnitude of the contraction of the stock of jobs. The number of jobs fell respectively, by 2.1 
and 2.3 per cent, compared to an annual average growth of employment over the sample period 
of 1.9 per cent.  Such large declines in employment are rare and, as such, provide a clue to the 
possible importance of counter-cyclical policies.  They are also pivotal for the design of our 
counterfactual simulations, presented in the next section. 
To put these outcomes in perspective, we can compare average growth rates of 
employment with average growth in the labour force. Figure 3 suggests that, apart from the 
very few periods of negative growth, the vast majority of years in the 1964 to 1999 period 
looked reasonably healthy. However, as Figure 2 implies and Table 1 illustrates, the average 
growth of employment since the mid-1960s has been marginally less than the average growth 
of the labour force, i.e. the economy has not been able to generate enough jobs to stop the 
unemployment rate from rising.  
 
 
Table 1: Average annual growth of employment and labour force,  
decade by decade, 1964 to 1999 
 
Period  Employment growth (per cent)  Labour force growth (per cent) 
1960 to 1969  3.12  3.17 
1970 to 1979  1.54  2.03 
1980 to 1989  2.22 2.35 
1990 to 1999  1.27  1.31 
1964 to 1999  1.93  2.13 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from: 
 ABS,  Labour Force, Australia, ABS Catalogue No, 6203.0 (various issues); 
  Reserve Bank of Australia, Australian Economic Statistics, 1964–1978, Sydney. 
 
  7 
The above relationships and outcomes are reflected in Figure 4 which provides a 
picture of Australia’s unemployment history over the last three decades. The most pronounced 
aspect of this graph is the substantial and rapid rise in unemployment at the onset of the 
recessions of the mid-1970s and the early 1980s and 1990s. There is, however, a noticeable 
lack of symmetry: during the expansionary phases of the business cycle the unemployment rate 
has declined very slowly and has not come down fully to the pre-recession level. That is, 
increasing unemployment seems to be associated with more pronounced difficulties associated 
with its reduction, a phenomenon known as hysteresis.  
 
 




















Sources: As for Figure 1. 
 
 
To illustrate how unemployment has increased over the period it is useful to look at 
simple period averages: during the 1960s the unemployment rate averaged 1.5 per cent; in the 
1970s the average was 4.2 per cent; in the 1980s, 8.1 per cent and in the 1990s, 9.6 per cent. In 
fact, the early nineties saw a consistent period of double digit unemployment rates with 11.6 
per cent being recorded in 1993 — the highest jobless rate since the depression of the 1930s.  
The impact of recessions on employment can also be assessed by comparing the 
employment-population ratio and employment growth. This is a useful extension because a fall 
in the employment-population ratio unambiguously indicates a deterioration in economic 
conditions (job availability) irrespective of whether it is accompanied by changes in the  8 
unemployment rate; as noted, a fall in the unemployment rate can come about through a lower 
participation rate which is a possible indication of a discouraged worker effect. However, if 
accompanied by a rising employment-population ratio a fall in the unemployment rate 
necessarily indicates an improving labour market situation. 
Figure 5 shows clearly the periods of significant contraction of employment growth 
and decreases in employment-population ratios. The very marked decreases in both measures 
in the early 1980s and 1990s is particularly striking and apposite for our later exercises 
 
 









































employment growth (left scale)
employment-population ratio (right scale)
 




Labour Market and Economic Policy  
We now consider a number of counter-factual experiments in order to illustrate the 
potential gains of anticipating an emerging problem and putting in place appropriate counter-
cyclical action. The obvious place to start is with the two outliers in the profile of employment 
growth: the troughs of the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s. An interesting 
question is: what would employment and unemployment profiles have looked like if instead of 
the 1983 and 1991 decreases in employment growth the economy experienced different 
situations?   9 
To address this question we consider three scenarios. Instead of the high negative 
employment growth values experienced  in 1983 and 1991, it is assumed that for these years: 
(i)  Employment growth was stagnant (i.e., a growth rate of zero per cent);  
(ii)  Employment growth was higher than it was by the annual average of employment 
growth in the lower half of the years between 1966 and 1999 – that is, 0.38 per cent 
is added to the actual employment growth in 1983 and 1991, giving new figures of  -
1.72 and –1.92; and  
(iii)  Employment growth was higher than it was by the annual average employment 
growth in the period 1966 to 1999 – that is, 1.93 per cent is added to the actual 
employment growth in 1983 and 1991. Thus the new employment growth rates for 
1983 and 1991 become -0.24 and -0.36 respectively.  
While these scenarios are “what if” questions it should be realized that during an 
international recession it is very difficult to imagine that the government could implement 
policies which would generate an extra growth equal to a sample average growth of 
employment. Thus, the third scenario provides what must be an upper bound on employment 
growth, to be contrasted with actual experience. The second scenario provides an exposition of 
the effect of a mildly successful counter-cyclical policy. Finally, scenario (i) implies a very 
strong intervention resulting in over 2 per cent additional job growth in both 1983 and 1991.  
Since the unemployment rate is a result of interactions between the supply of and the 
demand for labour, one cannot simply derive the profiles of the simulated unemployment rate 
on the basis of the new employment growth rates without taking account of the implied 
increases in labour supply. To handle a pro-cyclical participation response we have estimated 
an auxiliary equation linking the growth of the labour force with the current and lagged growth 
of employment and a time trend.6  This equation is then used to predict labour force 
participation rate increases (and, hence, the resulting growth in labour force) for each of the 
three scenarios of employment growth.   
Once both employment and the labour force are derived, we can then calculate the 
associated unemployment rates, reflecting  both changes in employment (the demand side) and 
changes in labour force participation (the supply side) under the three scenarios of employment 
growth.   
Our calculations of the resulting unemployment rate profile under the three scenarios 
are presented in Figure 6. Given that we influence only two points, the resulting profiles are all 
approximately of the same pattern. The major difference, however, is the magnitude of the 
generated unemployment rates. First, scenarios (i)and (iii) translate into a 1999 unemployment 
                                                            
6   Details of this equation are available on request from the authors.  10
rate of around 4.2 per cent. Scenario (ii) results in a 1999 unemployment rate of around 6 per 
cent. These are important results since, as is well known7, under-utilization of labour resources 
results in significant economic and social costs to the society including from individual loss of 































The exercises can be made more interesting through considering a component of the 
unemployment stock involving people more disadvantaged than others — the long-term 
unemployed. Through the use of techniques presented in Chapman, Junankar and Kapuscinski 
(1992), it is a straightforward matter to translate these generated unemployment rate scenarios 
into outcomes for long-term unemployment (LTU). The methodology involves estimating a 
reduced form model of LTU on a subset of the available data and forecasting the levels of LTU 
using the generated unemployment rates under different scenarios. Given the similarity of the 
unemployment rates for scenarios (i) and (iii), our discussion focusses on scenarios (ii) and (iii) 
representing  small and large changes respectively. The results of these forecasts is given in 
Figure 7. 
                                                            
7  See for example, Junankar and Kapuscinski 1992.  11
 
 

































A first point about these forecasts is that they follow a general pattern of cyclical 
variations with the profile of LTU still increasing quickly after a recession and falling slowly 
during a recovery. However, even a small decrease in unemployment (scenario (ii)) has 
significant repercussions: the average annual reduction in the number of long-term unemployed 
in absolute terms is around 55,000 people with the final value being approximately 60 per cent 
of the actual stock in 1999.  
The forecasts for scenario (iii), which are for marked increases in employment growth, 
suggest a reduction of LTU by over 100,000 people by 1999. These results highlight how 
critical it can be to avoid just a few very poor years of labour market performance.    
It is worth closing this section with a brief consideration of the policy significance of 
LTU. There are two basic points relating essentially to issues of distribution and 
macroeconomic efficiency. In terms of distribution (and equity) the case for attention being 
paid to the long-term unemployed is overwhelming. Members of the group are some of the 
least advantaged in the labour market, and are disproportionately made up by up of those with 
low formal skills and education, Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders, and/or immigrants  12
from non-English speaking backgrounds.8 Moreover, those with high unemployment duration 
are by definition not accumulating labour market experience, one of the most important 
determinants of future wage income. 
Long-term unemployment is also fundamental to policy due to its impact on 
macroeconomic efficiency. The basic point is that a labour supply pool with a large proportion 
of long-term unemployed will be a labour supply pool characterised by structural mismatch, 
with employers tending not to hire people with high unemployment duration. Such an outcome 
results in a wastage of society’s resources given that the labour market works more efficiently 
when the unemployed are able to slot easily into vacancies. Piggott and Chapman (1995) have 
estimated that long-term unemployment in the early 1990s cost Australian taxpayers around 
$1billion per annum from lost taxes and high welfare payments. In addition, there is 
considerable evidence that the associated structural mismatch decreases the potential for rapid 
recovery, because the skill losses associated with long-term unemployment imply that 
employers will be bargaining over a relatively small pool of “relevant” labour. This, in turn, 
implies higher prospects for wage inflation, even in periods of high measured unemployment, 
lower potential output, budgetary waste, and continuing inequities for those with lengthy 
unemployment duration.9  
 
Labour Force, Employment and Unemployment: the Future 
The projections of the population based on the medium scenario (which assumes a 
fertility rate of 1.75, current trends in mortality rate changes and net annual migration of 
70,000) and the projections of the labour force published by the ABS (1999) are shown in 
Figure 8.  
The Figure shows that, due to decreasing participation rates, the growth rate of labour 
force is expected to average about 0.8 per cent per annum (compared to 2.1 per cent over the 
last thirty years, and 1.3 per cent during the 1990s), which results in a labour force of 10.8 
million by 2016.10 It should be stressed that these medium term projections involve people 
who are already alive (since to be in the labour force in 2016 a person must be at least one year 
old in year 2000). As a result, variations in fertility and mortality will not be important 
influences on labour force projections. Related to this is that the labour force participation rate 
is likely to come down to levels lower than these experienced in the 1970s and 1980s.   
 
                                                            
8   See Junankar and Kapuscinski 1991; ABS 1994. 
9   See Budd, Levine and Smith 1987; Fahrer and Pease 1993.  13

















































labour force participation rate: actual
labour force participation rate: projected
 
Source: ABS (1999). 
 
Based on these projected population and labour force series it is straight-forward to 
derive employment levels consistent with unemployment following a certain profile, or vice 
versa. While we are unable to predict future economic conditions, it is sensible to ask what the 
required rates of growth of employment would be given target levels of unemployment 
(assuming there is no participation rate response). Figure 9 provides four scenarios of the future 
growth of employment (conditional on labour force projections) if a target unemployment rate 
is to be achieved over the next decade and a half. The four target values of the unemployment 
rate: 9, 7, 5 and 3 per cent.  
The data of Figure 9 can be understood as follows.  If target rates of unemployment are 
to be reached by 2016 average annual employment growth rates illustrated would achieve this 
(in a smooth fashion).  Of course, there is an infinite array of possible time paths that would 
achieve these outcomes; those shown are illustrative only. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10   The detailed breakdown shows that one third of the growth of the labour force is going to occur 
in the 45–54 age group while only 20 per cent of the growth will occur in the 20–44 age group.  14
Figure 9: Projected employment growth rates under different target unemployment rate 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































target UER = 9%
target UER = 7%






























￿target UER = 3%
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Based on these projections, achieving an unemployment rate of 5 per cent by 2016 
requires an average employment growth of just under 1 per cent, which ranges from 1.4 per 
cent in 2000 to 0.5 per cent in 2016. This target is not optimistic; it is worth remembering that 
employment growth of 1.4 per cent is much less than the sample average over the last three 
decades. Furthermore, in the light of historical profiles of the growth rates of employment and 
labour force, and given the projected growth rates of the labour force of 0.8 per cent, the 
average annual growth rate of employment of 0.98 per cent should be regarded as a credible 
target.  
Finally, we also consider the longer-term future of the labour force over the next three 
decades. In this period, demographic factors tend to assume much more important roles in 
driving the labour force than do cyclical (economic) factors. For example, the ABS publishes 
only one set of labour force projections (which were discussed above and which cover a 
relatively short period (up to a decade and a half) and assume a total fertility rate of 1.75, net 
migration of 70,000 and the continuation of current trends in mortality rates. Unpublished 
projections based on alternative assumptions indicate very little change in the population series 
and, hence, the projected labour force series.  15
Longer time periods, however, bring about an increased importance of such underlying 
assumptions on the labour force projections. Utilizing unpublished projections of labour force 
series by McDonald (2000), we can illustrate such an impact. Thus, Figure 10 compares two 
labour force projections: one based on a higher fertility rate (1.76) and one based on a lower 
fertility rate (1.5).  Both series assume 80,000 net migration and current profile of mortality 
rates. The results indicate that projections of labour force conditional on a lower fertility rate 
imply a slightly slower growth rate of the labour force (0.44) per cent per annum) than under 
the higher fertility rate (0.76 per cent per annum). As a result, the projected level of the labour 
force in 2030 is 10.9 and 11.2 million under the lower and higher fertility scenarios repectively. 
 



























based on high fertility rate (1.76)
based on low fertility rate (1.65)
 
Source: McDonald (2000), private communication. 
 
 
The unpublished projections of the labour force series by McDonald (2000) also allow 
a look into the age decomposition of the future labour force. While the basic trends and, in 
particular, the aging of the population,  are well known facts little discussion has so far been 
accorded the compositional changes in the labour force. However, Figure 11 indicates that over 
the next three decades there will be a substantial decrease in the share of young people in the 
work force (from around 38 per cent to 31.6 per cent).  16
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: McDonald (2000), private communication. 
 
 
The data also suggest that people aged 25 to 34 will also account for a decreasing 
proportion of the labour force: from 26.1 per cent in 2003 to 23.9 per cent three decades later. 
At the same time the proportion of people aged 55 to 64 will more than double, from 5.3 per 
cent to 11.2 per cent. A similar trend is also projected for the 45 to 54 age group: an increase 
from 7.7 per cent to 9.9 per cent. The only age group which seems to be unaffected by the 
demographic change is the 35 to 44 age group which is predicted to remain at 23 per cent of the 
total labour force. The compositional changes might well have important implications for the 
structure and nature of employment. 
 
Conclusions 
Population and labour force projections indicate that in the next three decades the growth of the 
labour force will slow. This is a consequence of current (and projected) declines in fertility, the 
subsequent slowing of the population growth rate, and the overall fall in participation rate. It 
should be noted that while aggregate female participation rates are increasing slowly, male 
rates are declining. Even though the former developments are bigger than the latter, the overall 
changes in the composition of the population (specifically, the relative increase in the size of 
the age groups with lower participation rates) explains the overall decline in participation rates. 
The analysis presented also indicates that understanding of labour force movements 
provides relatively few policy-relevant lessons. However our focus on unemployment provides  17
much more meaningful input into issues of policy. Our scenarios and the comparisons of the 
unemployment projections, even though derived in a theoretical way, indicate that the 
avoidance of just two bad employment growth years can substantially affect subsequent 
outcomes up to three decades later. This implies that avoidance of downturns and the possible 
role of pre-emptive active counter-cyclical policies are arguably critical to the long run health 
of the labour market, perhaps much more so than are policies designed to promote recovery. 
This is a particularly apposite point with respect to longer term unemployment, which remains 
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